Introduction
Sociology of philosophy is a relatively new discipline within sociology, aiming to link philosophical thought to the social conditions from which it has emerged. Before long, however, the scientific orientation that this ambition means for the discipline leads to the question what exactly is meant by the reference to 'social conditions.' In this article, I examine how two of the discipline's main representatives, Randall Collins (born 1941) and Pierre Bourdieu , understand the relationship between social conditions and philosophical thought in their main works on the subject. The general aim in this exercise is to provide a more precise definition of the notoriously vague notion of 'social conditions'/ 'social factors.' Such a closer definition is necessary for the sociology of philosophy if it is to be capable of proposing detailed explanations for philosophical changes, among other things. In other words, the sociology of philosophy must not content itself with merely drawing some general parallels between society and culture on the one hand and knowledge and thought on the other hand. The article also shows how the conceptual innovations by Bourdieu and Collins, put forward through their terminology of the 'philosophical field' (Bourdieu) and the 'attention space' (Collins), represent a clear step forward from Karl Mannheim's overly vague notion of 'existentially connected knowledge' [seinsverbundenes Wissen]. Basic differences between Bourdieu's and Collins's approaches, and the consequences that these differences have for how much autonomy each author is prepared to ascribe to the philosophical field /attention space, will then be considered in closer detail. Finally, the argument will be made for the superiority of Bourdieu's explanatory model compared to that of Collins's, based on its ability to build on the strengths of both Mannheim's and Collins's work in the area while avoiding the pitfalls of each.
Philosophical cultures, the theme of this special issue, are one of the social factors influencing philosophical thinking. As will become clear from what follows, the models put forward by Bourdieu and Collins differ from each other in the extent to which they each, in principle at least, allow for the influence of a certain culture on philosophical thought. Before I enter into this discussion, however, a few more general observations on the subject of the sociology of philosophy are in order.
The sociology of philosophy is a sub-discipline within the broader field of sociology of knowledge. Both Collins and Bourdieu are heavily influenced by the classical tradition of the sociology of knowledge, which can be traced back to Émile Durkheim and Karl Mannheim. They both make use of inherited conceptual tools devised already by their predecessors working within that tradition. Collins, for instance, borrows Durkheim's notion of collective effervescence for his sociology of philosophy, and, though he never openly acknowledged his theoretical indebtedness to Mannheim, the latter's inspiration is clearly in evidence in the work of Bourdieu. Just like Mannheim, Bour-
